This idea-one combined financial services regulator-became the first half of a more substantial proposal-'Twin Peaks'. Taylor" argued for a fusion of the multiple regulators then in existence -regulators charged with banking, securities, insurance and investment management. These regulators included the Bank of England, the Building Societies Commission 2 and the Securities and Investments
Board (SIB).
1 3 Under Taylor's plan, a new financial services regulator would henceforth assume authority for all deposit-taking institutions 4 and, crucially, would no longer simply enforce bank regulations against individual transactions. It would be charged with ensuring the overall stability of the financial system by regulating bank capital and the control of risk. 15 Specifically, Taylor envisaged that the bank regulator would address the 'financial soundness of institutions -including capital adequacy and large exposure requirements, measures relating to systems, controls and provisioning policies, and the vetting of senior managers to ensure that they possessed an appropriate level of experience and skill.' 16 The collapse of Barings Bank" in 1995 provided further impetus" for the adoption of a single bank regulator.
Under Taylor's proposal a second regulator would then be created, charged with protecting consumers from unscrupulous operators: a market conduct and consumer protection regulator, 1 9 the remit of which would be to ensure that consumers were treated fairly and honestly 2 0 by protecting them against 'fraud, incompetence, or the abuse of market power'. 2 1 Measures would include restrictions on the advertising, marketing and sale of financial products, as well as minimum fit and proper standards for salespeople. 2 2 In the event of conflict between the two regulators, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would provide a resolution. According to Taylor, 2 3 this would address four issues simultaneously:
1. that henceforth a wide range of financial firms would have to be regarded as systemically important;
11 Hilton, supra, note 5.
12 Taylor, supra, note 6, at p. 3. 13 Hilton, supra, note 5, at p. 2. 14 Taylor, supra, note 6, at p. 2. that sprawling and disparate regulatory agencies be regarded as presenting opportunities for regulatory arbitrage 2 4 and turf battles over jurisdiction; 2 5 3. that in the ever increasing cases of financial conglomerates, a group-wide perspective on financial soundness would be addressed; 26 and 4. that rare and specialist expertise and limited supervisory resources would be pooled, instead of duplicated by overlapping.
The benefits of Twin Peaks are clear. The proposed structure would eliminate regulatory duplication and overlap; it would create regulatory bodies with a clear and precise remit; it would establish mechanisms for resolving conflicts between the objectives of financial services regulation; and it would encourage a regulatory process which is open, transparent and publicly accountable.
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These examples show why structure does, and should matter, if we wish to create an efficient, effective system of financial services regulation. 25 Taylor, supra, note 6, at p. 11. 26 Ibid., at p. 5, Taylor discusses the issue of psychological contagion, that is to say a collapse in depositor confidence, not because an entity is directly involved in a loss, but because another entity -a subsidiary -another part of the same conglomerate, is involved in a loss. This possibility-that retail depositor panic can set off a bank run across all associated entities -underscores the importance of a whole-of-entity approach to regulation. See also Llewellyn, supra, note 24, at p. 9. 27 Taylor, supra, note 6, at p. Rather, they have been due to a weak enforcement culture which has bedevilled especially the market conduct and consumer protection peak, and to which this article will return.
Similarly, Llewellyn argues that integrated agencies are more likely to suffer reputational harm, due to the failures of one particular division within the agency and, as a result, consumer confidence in the regulator may be weakened. 31 This argument does comport with the Australian experience, in relation to the manner in which the market conduct and consumer protection agency has handled an ongoing series of financial advice scandals. The 'Twin Peaks' model was proposed by, and implemented on, the conclusion of the Wallis Commission of Inquiry in 1997. 34 In the case of the prudential regulator (PA), this replaced 11 separate regulators. 35 To wit, Australia separated the market conduct and consumer protection authority -the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC)-from the bank regulator-the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA)-and the National Central Bank (NCB) -the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA). 36 Crucially, APRA is not a division of the RBA, whereas in other jurisdictions that have adopted Twin Peaks, the PA has been incorporated as a division of the NCB, and this is the arrangement envisaged for South Africa.
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Under Twin Peaks, the RBA is tasked with, inter alia, overall responsibility for the financial system and as lender of last resort (LLR) . 38 The Australian model could, therefore, reasonably have been described as a three-peak model, with each peak created as an independent, statutory body. There was little science involved in determining the dividing lines between the ratings, it was more a question of whether the overall result seemed to make sense ... 54 What this flexibility belies, however, is a lack of coherent methodology. Rather, reliance is made on intuition and supposition. There is, however, a wealth of evidence from psychology that 'gut instincts' are frequently unreliable. Evidence of the failure of this approach is to be found in the rogue trading scandal at National Australia Bank, which resulted in losses of $360 million to the bank, and which APRA ascribed to 'cultural issues'. ('The Dutch Bank' (DNB)). This is similar to the arrangement in the UK, but distinct from Australia, where, as mentioned previously, the prudential regulator (APRA) is separate from the NCB. The Dutch copied the Australian approach, particularly as it applied to supervisory strategy -PAIRS and SOARS -both of which the Dutch regulator, the DNB, adopted. 60 While the Netherlands, under a Twin Peaks regime, managed to stave off the worst of the GFC, success for the Dutch authorities in an economy with such an important financial sector was not achieved without 'drastic' 6 1 government intervention:
Total foreign claims of Dutch banks amounted to over 300% of GDP. The Dutch financial system therefore depended heavily on external developments. Only the Belgian and Irish banking sectors were in a similar position. The European average was less than half the Dutch figure at 135% of GDP ... exposure of Dutch banks to the United States also was the highest in Europe, at 66% of GDP ... whereas the average of European banks had kept limited exposure of less than 30% of GDP. By contrast, the exposure of Dutch banks to hard-hit Eastern European countries was at 11% of GDP just above the European average of 8% of GDP.
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Intervention during the crisis took the form of measures to stimulate employment through: construction and housing (E6 billion); capital injections for banks and insurers (E20 billion); state guarantees for banks (E200 billion); a guarantee on all deposits up to E100,000;64 the nationalisation of Fortis/ABN AMRO (E16.8 billion), the ING banking group (E10 billion) (comprising 85 per cent of the Dutch banking sector 6 5 ) and the SNS REAAL insurance and banking group (E3.7 billion); 6 6 and a reform of the financial system and the capital levels that had been enforced to date. Thereafter the Dutch government was compelled to drastically reduce spending in order to reduce its deficit. 67 In the aftermath of the crisis, the conclusions reached about the performance of the Dutch regulators were less than positive:
Both in the run-up to and during the credit crisis, supervisory instruments fell short in several areas. These deficiencies emerged in both the scope and the substance of supervision. The trend towards lighter supervision, reflecting developments within the financial sector as well as changed social attitudes, [had] gone too far.
68
This finding supports the conclusions reached in the analysis of the performance of the UK regulatory authorities during the GFC, namely that regulatory architecture alone is not a panacea against financial crises. Doubtless regulatory architecture is part of the solution, but no more so than the capacity of the regulators to foresee, at times, the unforeseeable 6 9 and regulate accordingly, and the willingness of the regulators to enforce their regulations.
D. South Africa
For South Africa the problem of the current regulatory structure was highlighted, with a degree of disapproval, by modelled broadly on that currently in use in Australia. Historically South Africa had adopted an institutional approach in which banks, insurers and capital markets were regarded as separate species. Regulation was typified by a lack of coordination. 4 The 1987 de Kock Commission Report, chaired by Dr Gerhardus de Kock, later Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, reformed the regulatory system in South Africa, and implemented a functional financial regulatory approach.
While the 1993 Melamet Commission, chaired by Judge David Melamet, recommended a single regulator, the regulatory system has remained functional and partially integrated. 76 Currently the financial system is regulated by the South (2) The following principles must guide the registrar in considering whether or not a declaration contemplated in subsection (1) should be made: (a) That the practice concerned, directly or indirectly, has or is likely to have the effect of-(i) harming the relations between authorised financial services providers or any category of such providers, or any such provider, and clients or the general public; (ii) unreasonably prejudicing any client; (iii) deceiving any client; or (iv) unfairly affecting any client; and (b) that if the practice is allowed to continue, one or more objects of this Act will or is likely to, be defeated. The registrar may direct an authorised financial services provider who, on or after the date of the publication of a notice referred to in subsection (1), carries on the business practice concerned in contravention of that notice, to rectify to the satisfaction of the registrar anything which was caused by or arose out of the carrying on of the business practice concerned: provided that the registrar may not make an order contemplated in section The financial sector regulatory framework is modern and generally effective. There is a need to strengthen supervision of conglomerates with a focus on risks that span more than one sector, and to further promote cooperation, consistency, and effectiveness among regulators.96
As a result the South African Treasury issued a report on financial sector regulation, 9 7 aimed at addressing the shortcomings identified by the IMF Report.
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Principally the South African Treasury Report proposed the adoption of a Twin Peaks model of financial system regulation. 9 9 The Treasury Report stated:
The twin peaks approach is regarded as the optimal means of ensuring that transparency, market integrity, and consumer protection receive sufficient priority, and given South Africa's historical neglect of market conduct regulation, a dedicated regulator responsible for consumer protection, and not automatically presumed to be subservient to prudential concerns, is probably the most appropriate way to address this issue ... the existence of separate prudential and market conduct regulators may be a way of creating a system of checks and balances, thereby avoiding the vesting of too much power in the hands of a single agency ... the flip side of creating checks and balances is the need to carefully define roles and responsibilities to avoid duplication of work and jurisdictional overlap ... separation of prudential and market conduct regulation does not eliminate the possibility of conflict between them ... consultation between the two bodies would lead to an acceptable compromise. But if not, some external means would need to be found to reconcile objectives. In South Africa, the formal way of resolving conflict will be through the Council of Financial Regulators.
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As a result, the South African Treasury has put forward a draft Financial Sector Regulation Bill which, as at time of writing, had recently been tabled in South Africa's National Parliament. 01 The Bill makes provisions for the establishment of a Twin Peaks system in South Africa, and envisages the creation of a Financial System Council of Regulators, 10 2 which will coordinate financial regulation, and the Financial Stability Oversight Committee, 10 3 which will coordinate financial stability issues and endeavour to mitigate risks to the financial system.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT METHODOLOGY IN AUSTRALIA
This section provides an analysis of risk-based financial regulation and its close cousins, 10 4
principles-based and outcomes-focused regulation. Because these are terms of art, not science, they cannot be defined, or indeed even separated, precisely. They do, however, share methodological and philosophical characteristics, which bear investigating. As suggested by Black: What lies under the labels is an agglomeration of regulatory styles and approaches, some of which are exhibited by some regulators, but not all of which are exhibited by all ... a rough guide to a roughly drawn regulatory world and how it has evolved. 10 5
Put simply, the hierarchy may be understood as follows: risk-based regulations are the tactics for addressing the strategy provided by outcomes-focused regulation: risk-based regulation is focused on outcomes and has, therefore, a natural affinity with, and folds into, an outcomes-focused paradigm.
10 6 Outcomes-focused strategies, in turn, address the grand strategy outlined by principles-based regulation. There are a number of advantages to a risk-based approach." Most notably there is an acknowledgment that in a rules-based paradigm of financial system regulation, regulators are often over-burdened by rules -rules which cannot be enforced in every firm, for every transaction, on every occasion. Selecting what to prioritise is, therefore, necessary and, according to Black," '[t]hese selections have always been made, but risk-based frameworks both render the fact of selection explicit and provide a framework of analysis in which they can be made' and in which it is possible to:
A. Risk-Based
... pick important problems and fix them.
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But pragmatic as this approach may sound, it leads to several unintended consequences which, in turn, undermine the overall efficacy of this regulatory paradigm. These include the following:
* There is an assumption that regulators are smart enough to 'foresee the unforeseeable'.120 Put differently, there is an assumption that regulators will know from where the next financial crisis will come and, consequently, correctly identify which types of risks and what forms of conduct to prioritise. But, as was seen during the GFC, this assumption is not always correct:
... indeed with respect to the global financial crisis more broadly, assumptions that had been made as to how markets would react in particular scenarios proved significantly misplaced, with risk events that had been anticipated to occur once in several lives of the universe ... occurring every day.121 * The model itself may incorrectly prioritise which risks to avoid, as distinct from a failure to identify the risk at all, and this was evident from the conclusions reached in the aftermath of the failure of HIH.
12 2 * There exists the potential for process-induced myopia, that is to say a focus on the process upon which risk-based regulation relies, without paying sufficient attention to issues that are outside the scope of what is covered by the process:
If little scope is given in practice for those engaged in working within the framework to work outside it where they see the need, the framework will always be prey to events that those working within it were not given the room to say they had seen.
12 3
To this end anecdotal evidence suggests that criticism of APRA and challenges to the organisation's prevailing orthodoxies are in danger of being met with hostility. 124 This anecdotal evidence is based upon the writer's tenure at APRA in late 2013 and informal discussions with colleagues. 125 See Black, supra, note 106, at p. 10. See also Black, supra, note 34, at pp. 24ff, where she asserts that politically, a failing bank, which may be acceptable to the regulator, may be unacceptable to those in the community who stand to lose their deposits. To this can be added political pressure from bank owners for the bank to be rescued, despite the regulator's willingness to allow the bank to fail. that similar conduct was expressly authorised by the regulator in the past (constituting, as it did then, an acceptable risk). * What Llewellynl 2 7 refers to as the 'Christmas tree effect', 12 8 in which the regulator's remit steadily increases -as perceptions of risk increase-with a wide array of ancillary functions, both to the point of over-burden and distraction from what should be core activities. * Perceptions of risk are exactly that: perceptions. While APRA has attempted to create a methodology around the assessment of risk and to lessen the impact upon the assessment of risk of individual perceptions, risk assessment is not and never will be as 'rational"
[or] as consistent in substance as its form suggests'. B.
Outcomes-Focused Regulation
The risk-based approach followed by the Australian prudential regulator falls easily within a 'regulation by objective'130 paradigm, that is to say a paradigm the purpose of which is to '[achieve] particular and concrete outcomes'. 1 3 1 This paradigm enjoys a number of advantages. These include the following:
* Regulators can be more effective, with each having clear objectives (outcomes) that do not overlap. * Regulators can, as a result, be more accountable and more focused 3 2 on achieving those outcomes.
* It creates checks and balances between agencies, and their objectives.
13 3 * It allows each regulator to create its own culture that best suits its objectives.
* It allows each regulator to acquire expertise specifically required to meet its objectives.
13 4
As with a risk-based paradigm, so too an outcomes-focused approach has its shortcomings. These relate to the manner in which objectives are identified and prioritised. As with a risk-based approach the danger remains that:
* the regulator may identify the wrong objectives; or * may initially identify the correct objectives but fail to adjust these in light of changed circumstances; or * may find itself captured by industry with a concomitant contamination of its objectives; or * become suborned by political masters in which the regulator's objectives are once again contaminated.
Put differently, with flexibility in priorities come opportunities for a more nuanced approach to combating whatever problem the regulator is charged with preventing. But so too, with flexibility come the pitfalls that arise wherever regulators are invested with discretion.
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C. Principles-Based Regulation
Both these approaches -objectives-based regulation and risk-based regulation-have as their overarching paradigm principles-based regulation, in that neither focus on systems and processes but on principles-based outcomes. Principles-based regulation, as an overarching paradigm too, has its deficiencies. A principles based model sets forth broad principles to be followed, as opposed to prescriptive, inflexible rules governing specific activities and requiring minimum standards of conduct:
[It] ... means moving away from reliance on detailed, prescriptive rules and relying more on high-level, broadly stated rules or principles to set the standards by which regulated firms must conduct business. The term 'principles' can be used simply to refer to general rules, or also to suggest that these rules are implicitly higher in the implicit or explicit hierarchy of norms than more detailed rules: they express the fundamental obligations that all should observe.
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So regulators, instead of focusing on prescribing the processes or actions that firms must take, should step back and define the outcomes that they require firms to achieve. Firms and their management will then be free to find the most efficient way of achieving the outcome required. 137 In 2008 the Australian Law Reform Commission Report into privacy put forth the following statement by Curtis to explain the advantages of a principles-based regulatory regime:
By encouraging organisations to recognise the business advantages of [compliance] and regulating their behaviour accordingly ...
[a] regulatory approach where a legislative framework is balanced by an emphasis on ... self-regulation ... [ These sentiments, expressed in respect of privacy regulations, have been expressed in similar vein to support the supposed advantages of a principles-based regulatory regime for the financial system. 13 9 There is, however, a difference between information privacy regulations and financial system regulations, and one so crucial that it undermines the supposed advantages of the principles-based model: financial system regulations almost always contain an opportunity cost to the regulatee in addition to the mere compliance cost. 140 Put differently, in the financial system the costs of full regulatory compliance are potentially significantly higher, 1 41 and the degree of convenience to the bank for noncompliance significantly greater. 142 In this regard it is questionable whether Black is correct when she asserts that: '[r]egulatees have to take more responsibility for ensuring that they are achieving the right outcomes, not just going through the right processes' 1 4 3 as this does not adequately take account of the compulsion, inherent in financial regulation, for regulatees to constantly look for ways to lessen the impact of the regulations to which they ought to adhere, not just including but especially in respect of outcomes.
Add to this the heady mixture created by a regulatory paradigm that is more one of managing conduct than enforcing discipline, 1 " is located within an overall strategy that seeks, at least initially, to be cooperative and collegial as opposed to confrontational, 145 and seeks by negotiated settlement to define outcomes more general than specific, then it is no wonder that goals shift and outcomes become malleable:
A principles-based approach does not work with individuals who have no principles.
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Indeed, one could argue that if it is outcomes that are set as benchmarks, as opposed to processes, 147 then all that is required in order to encourage regulators to forebear is to re-negotiate the outcomes; a clearer and more straightforward objective than re-negotiating a myriad of complex processes.
A further important factor determining the efficacy of regulators is the political climate in which they operate. 148 This will affect the robustness of enforcement and may extend to the vigour with which principles are at first determined and later adjusted. The degree to which the United States' Congress is beholden to Wall Street 1 49 and the pushback against the FSAso in the UK are instructive in this respect.
And fashions, even in regulation, change. In the UK, Antony Jenkins, the patron saint of conduct risk, has just been unceremoniously dumped as CEO of Barclays Bank, ostensibly for concentrating on managing the bank's toxic conduct rather than making profits. The conduct risk pendulum may already be beginning to swing back and the current fashion for piousness may be fading. 153 For example the regulators follow policies set forth under Basel II in which banks are permitted to determine their own internal risk ratings.154 Put differently, IRB"' models, as they are known, permit a bank to determine whether it is complying with overall prudential principles, a model which gives rise to a dangerous conflict of interest 5 6 and one that is now being dismantled.
So while risk-based supervision, within a framework of outcomes-focused and principles-based regulatory strategies, has advantages -especially as regards the prioritising of risks in an environment where risks and potential risks are potentially limitless-they are nonetheless vulnerable to institutional inadequacies, incorrect priorities, political interference, industry pressure and a failure to foresee the unforeseeable. They lead to a capricious and unpredictable regulatory environment in which priorities are malleable and regulators are susceptible to capture.
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IV. AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH AFRICA, DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES
The most noticeable difference between the Australian approach and the proposed South African model is that the Australian Prudential Regulator is an independent entity, 15 9 whereas the South African proposal is for the Prudential Authority to be a division of the South African Reserve Bank, 16 and the annual reporting requirements.
1 68 Consequently, this comports with Taylor's original recommendation, 16 9 which he claims is more likely to negate the politicisation of the regulator, than would an arrangement that requires the regulator to be responsible only to Parliament. The internal logic of this argument is, however, difficult to discern. It could just as easily be argued that responsibility to Parliament may ameliorate pressure from the Treasury, and may serve to countervail the possibility of regulatory capture.
While there is no definitive answer to the question of whether it is better to locate the prudential regulator within the NCB, or outside, the balance of probabilities favours the latter. V. CONCLUSION If South Africa continues to develop and succeeds in lifting more South Africans out of poverty, ever greater calls will be made on the private sector to provide a wide variety of savings and investment products and self-funded social insurance. An agency dedicated to market conduct and consumer protection will, therefore, become ever more necessary.
A bifurcated system, it is argued, is preferable. One entity will be responsible for system stability, including ongoing prudential regulatory enforcement and development of all financially significant firms, including banks, insurers or a combination of the two, on a single and consolidated basis. This will prove even more important in the future, as the lines between banks, merchant banks and insurers continue to be blurred, and as the scale of interconnectedness between financial firms continues apace, particularly in the OTC"' derivatives market, in which banks and securities firms are the primary dealers. The size of the OTC market, the global notional value of which was a staggering US$710 trillion as at December 2013,172 represents the clearest indication of the potential for interconnectedness, and poses a significant threat to any financial system through contagion, both endogenous and exogenous. Only a whole-of-entity, consolidated 167 The Financial Stability Oversight Committee gives the SARB (of which the prudential regulator would be, it is envisaged, a department) ultimate responsibility for financial stability: section 4, Financial Sector Regulation Bill, 11 December 2013, and would be required to report to the Minister any threats to system stability: section 5(2)(d), ibid., and which would, twice a year, be required to report to the Minister on the overall state of system stability: section 9, ibid. 168 Part 7, section 39(1)(a), ibid., which requires the regulatory authorities to report within 90 days of the end of the financial year, and section 39(1)(b) which requires the Minister to table the regulatory authorities' reports within 30 days to the National Assembly (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa). Section 39(3), ibid., requires the regulatory authorities to submit to the Minister a report on any other matter that may affect system stability, public finances or any other matter deemed necessary, and must do so on an ad hoc basis and of its own initiative. group approach can hope to address this interconnectedness. So, while South Africa came through the GFC relatively unscathed, due mainly to the conservative nature of its banking system, 17 3 the experience gained from the GFC was that increasingly esoteric products, created by securities firms beyond the purview of institutional or functional regulators, created a blind spot for regulators in the USA and Europe, 17 4 one that ultimately had catastrophic economic consequences.
The second entity will be responsible for market conduct and consumer protection. It is argued such a system would be more likely to resolve fragmentation, provide clarity of ambit, be more cost-effective due to rulebook simplification and improve accountability -more likely, but not definitely, as the recent failings of ASIC in Australia have demonstrated.
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If the consumer protection and market conduct regulator does prove effective, then advantages accrue to consumers for a 'one-stop shop' 17 6 for complaints against regulated firms. Ultimately, of course, the success of a Twin Peaks regime in South Africa will depend upon the efficacy of enforcement -governance -and this in turn will depend upon the goals that are set -the principles -and on how those goals are pursued. That in turn will depend upon market intelligence -the risks -along with the independence and the capacity of the regulators to pursue corrective action free of interference or industry capture, coordination between the peaks, the resources -physical and human -which the regulators bring to bear, and their willingness, if need be, to take on vested and powerful interests.
If successful, Twin Peaks will help lay the foundations for a dynamic financial sector, one that already plays a significant role -an excessive role according to some -in South Africa's economy. If Twin Peaks fails, and fails under the wrong circumstances, such as another global financial crisis, the results will be catastrophic.
